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INSURANCE-REGULATION UNDER THE McCARRAN-FERGUSON Acr-FTC 
JURISDICTION NoT OUSTED BY A STATE STATUTE PURPORTING To CoNTRoL DE-
CEPTIVE ADVERTISING MAILED TO OTHER STATES-Petitioner issued a cease-
and-desist order prohibiting respondent from making statements in its ad-
vertising materials which violated the Federal Trade Commission Act.t 
1 Federal Trade Commission Act, 88 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 
(1958). The power to regulate advertising practices is derived from that part of the 
FTCA which directs the FTC to prevent persons subject to the act from using "unfair 
methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." 
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Respondent, a Nebraska health insurance company, mailed its circulars 
to residents of every state. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "the 
Federal Trade Commission Act ... shall be applicable to the business of in-
surance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."2 
A Nebraska statute prohibits an insurer domiciled there from engaging 
in unfair business practices in any state.3 In an action to set aside the FTC 
cease-and-desist order, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit accepted 
respondent's argument that its business was regulated by Nebraska law and 
thus insulated from FTC authority.4 On certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court, held, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further pro-
ceedings, three Justices dissenting. Congress did not intend extraterritorial 
regulation by the state of domicile to displace FTC jurisdiction. FTC v. 
Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960). 
The problem of interpreting what Congress intended by the phrase 
"regulated by State law"5 has been intensified by the substantial growth 
of mail-order insurance business which has occurred since the enactment in 
1945 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.6 In FTC v. National Gas. Co.,7 in-
surance companies which were licensed to do business in the receiving states 
circulated misleading brochures through local agents. The Court con-
cluded that FTC jurisdiction was ousted in those states which were regu-
lating such advertising.s However, the majority in the principal case did 
not consider the National Casualty decision controlling with respect to 
Nebraska's attempt to protect the people of other states from deceptive 
circulars mailed by its domiciliary.9 According to the Court, Congress en-
2 McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 
u.s.c. §§ 1011-15 (1958). 
3 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 44-1501 to -1521 (Supp. 1959). Section 44-1503 states: "No person 
domiciled in or resident of this state shall engage in unfair methods of competition or in 
unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance in any 
other state, territory, possession, province, country, or district." Section 44-1506 authorizes 
the Director of Insurance to prefer charges against a violating insurer, and 44-1509 
authorizes the issuance of a cease-and-desist order. 
-¼ Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, 262 F .2d 241 (8th Cir. 1959). The court felt that 
with every activity of respondent in the conduct of its business subject to the supervision 
of the Director of Insurance of Nebraska, respondent's solicitation practices could not 
realistically be held to be unregulated by Nebraska law. 
ti A decision that the business of insurance was not commerce had served to usher in 
seventy-five years of state regulation. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). Then 
the Supreme Court reversed itself and subjected the insurance business to potential 
federal control. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
This latter decision initiated legislation culminating in the l\fcCarran-Ferguson Act. See 
generally SAWYER, INSURANCE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE 1-82 (1944); Kimball & Boyce, 
The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in His-
torical Perspective, 56 l\f1CH. L. REv. 545 (1958). 
6 l\fcCarter, Recent Misleading and Deceptive Mail Order Accident and Health In-
surance Policies and Advertising, 1956 INS. L.J. 247, 251. 
7 357 U.S. 560 (1958). Here, the Supreme Court reviewed two decisions which had 
set aside orders of the FTC: American Hospital & Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719 (5th 
Cir. 1957); National Cas. Co. v. FTC, 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957). See gener~lly Chellberg, 
Regulation of Insurance- the State-Federal Controversy, 7 DE PAULL. REv. 25 (1957). 
s FTC v. National Cas. Co., supra note 7, at 564. 
o Principal case at 297. 
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acted the McCarran-Ferguson Act to remove any commerce clause obstacles 
to continued insurance regulation by the states.1° Because of their prox-
imity to the business, states were considered better able than the federal 
government to provide effective regulation.11 In applying this rationale 
to the principal case, the Court apparently assumed that the FTC would be 
considered by Congress to be closer than Nebraska to affected parties in 
other states. When one considers the uniform acts in the field12 and the 
cooperation of insurance commissioners,13 it can be doubted that the FTC 
is in fact closer to the targets of the insurer's misrepresentations. Never-
theless, the legislative history14 convinced the majority that the FTC could 
be displaced only through regulation by states in which the deceptive cir-
culars were received.16 Finally, the majority had doubts about the con-
stitutionality of the Nebraska statute when applied to misrepresentations dis-
seminated in other states.is 
The principal case leaves open the question whether regulation by the 
states receiving respondent's advertising would divest the FTC of jurisdic-
tion when the ties between these states and respondent are slender in com-
parison to the contacts present in National Casualty.11 Under the circum-
stances of the principal case, effective regulation by a recipient state de-
pends upon that state's ability to obtain jurisdiction over the insurance 
company to issue an effective cease-and-desist order.18 In light of two 
10 The decision in the South-Eastern Underwriters case had jeopardized the entire 
existing state regulatory structure. 
11 See Joint Hearings on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, H.R. 3270 Before the Subcommittees of 
the Committees on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 37, 117, 238-39, 242-43, 244, 252 
(1945); 90 CoNG. REc. 6532 (1944); 91 CONG. REc. 1087 (1945). 
12 See MonEL FAm TRADE PRACTICES Ac:r which was drafted by the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners. NATIONAL Ass'N OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS PRO• 
CEEDINGS 392-400 (1947). 
13 See generally Layne, Multiple State Regulation of Mail Order Insurance, 39 GEO. 
L.J. 422 (1951); Note, 45 GEO. L.J. 85 (1956). 
14 See 91 CONG. REc. 1442-44, 1477-89 (1945). The following are samples of statements 
made on the Senate floor by members of the Conference Committee on the McCarran 
Act: By Senator O'Mahoney at 1483, "State regulation must be for the state and not for 
the United States," and at 1483, "Nothing in the proposed law would authorize a State 
to try to regulate for other States .... " By Senator Ferguson at 1484, "If the Senator's 
statement was that the proposed act would permit a State to regulate interstate commerce -
insurance is interstate commerce - in the various States, the State could not do it." See 
generally Comment, 23 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 317 (1945). 
15 But this is subject to question as some excerpts from the legislative history indicate 
that a state could rely on another state's controlling the interstate advertising of its 
domiciliary. See 91 CONG. REc. 1442, 1481 (1945). 
16 Principal case at 302 citing Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 
294 U.S. 532 (1935); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915); Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914). This attitude was not shared by the three dissenting Justices 
who in support of their position cited Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 
(1909). Principal case at 305. 
17 The court of appeals did not consider regulation by any state other than Nebraska, 
and the Supreme Court accordingly did not consider this issue but extended the invitation 
to respondent to raise the question in a subsequent proceeding, principal case at 298 n. 4. 
18 Mccarter, supra note 6, at 256. 
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decisions of the past decade,19 it appears certain that contracting by mail 
to provide insurance is sufficient contact to enable a state to exercise juris-
diction. A valid cease-and-desist order could be issued,20 and upon fail-
ure to comply the state could obtain a judgment against the insurer. A 
major problem, however, arises concerning the usefulness of this judgment. 
Under the doctrine that a state has no obligation to award full faith and 
credit to a judgment obtained in a proceeding to enforce the penal laws of a 
sister state,21 a state in which the insurance company has assets would not 
be required to give credit to the judgment of a recipient state. This ex-
ception to full faith and credit is based upon a respect for state sovereignty22 
and a policy that an individual state is alone concerned with the enforce-
ment of its rules of public order and discipline.23 However, a state 
is required to extend full faith and credit to a foreign judgment 
recovered in a civil suit which could not have been maintained under 
local law because of a contrary public policy.24 Some writers have con-
cluded that no reason exists for not applying the same rule to penal claims 
which have been reduced to judgment.25 Furthermore, in Milwaukee 
County v. M. E. White Co.,26 the Court held that a judgment for taxes is 
not penal. It was stressed that the obligation to pay taxes is a form of quasi-
contractual liability enforceable by a common law debt action.27 On the 
other hand, recovery of a pecuniary penalty by a recipient state cannot be 
distinguished from enforcement of traditional criminal law.28 It has also been 
argued that the Milwaukee County decision was grounded on reasoning that 
no state could have a policy against the payment of another state's taxes 
and that this reasoning should be extended to the fair trade practices area 
where there is also a unity of public policy among the states.29 There is, 
however, virtually complete agreement on public policy in the area of tra-
ditional criminal law. Therefore, if judgments for violation of unfair trade 
10 McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Vir-
ginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). 
20 Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, supra note 19. 
21 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1888). See Huntington v. 
Attreill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) (dictum); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) 66 (1825); 
REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 611 (1934), § 443 (1948 Supp.). See generally GOOD-
RICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 24-29, 623-25 (3d ed. 1949); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 118-120 
(2d ed. 1951). 
22 Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Government Claims, 46 HARv. L. REv. 
193 (1932). 
23 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 25 (3d ed. 1949). 
24 Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947); Titus v. Wollick, 306 U.S. 282 (1939); Faunt-
leroy v, Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). 
21'.i Mccarter, supra note 6, at 256-60; Notes, 20 MINN, L. REv. 431 (1936) and 84 U. 
PA. L. REv. 526 (1936). 
26 296 U.S. 268, 271 (1935). 
27 Ibid. 
28 It has been argued that the exception should be limited to those penal claiIUS by 
which enforcement of traditional criminal law is sought. Leflar, supra note 22. 
20 See Brief for Appellant, p. 7, Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, Civil No. 15743 (8th 
Cir. 1960). 
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laws were considered non-penal or if the unity-of-policy argument were 
accepted, the penal judgment exception could be circumvented. The posi-
tion that both civil and penal judgments should receive similar treatment 
under full faith and credit meets the problem directly while avoiding 
tenuous extensions of Milwaukee County. However, even if it is conceded 
that full faith and credit need not be awarded to a penal judgment, there is 
no constitutional prohibition to such credit being extended. In accord with 
a declared public policy against misleading advertising practices, the 
domiciliary state could entertain such an action as a matter of comity,s0 
although it is doubtful that Congress intended effective regulation to de-
pend upon such a voluntary extension of full faith and credit. Thus if the 
Court avoids extending Milwaukee County but is unwilling to overrule the 
penal judgment exception, it seems likely that despite the existence of 
recipient state regulation,31 its ineffectiveness will result in upholding 
FTC authority on facts similar to those in the principal case. 
Thomas D. Heekin 
so Brief for the Health Insurance Ass'n of America as Amicus Curiae, p. 26, Travelers 
Health Ass'n v. FTC, Civil No. 15743 (8th Cir. 1960). This argument is supported by the 
fact that the MODEL FAIR TRADE PRACTICES Acr has now been enacted in all fifty states 
and Puerto Rico and the UNIFORM UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS SER.VICE OF PROCESS Acr has 
been enacted in forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
31 Involved in this entire discussion is the question whether "regulated" requires the 
mere existence of state laws or the existence of effective regulation. See National Cas. Co. 
v. FTC, 357 U.S. 560 (1958); Kimball Be Boyce, supra note 5, at 588; Orfield, Impruving 
State Regulation of Insurance, 32 MINN. L REv. 219 (1948). To the extent, as urged by 
the dissent in the principal case, that the National Casualty decision indicates that mere 
existence of state laws is enough, FTC jurisdicion may be ousted in the principal case 
regardless of penal judgment problems. The result would be the complete absence of 
any regulation which is certainly not what Congress intended. 
